

NORX8 and NORX16: AEAD for Low-End Systems

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Overview

NORX32/64

- ▶ CAESAR candidate.
- ▶ Based on 32-/64-bit words.
- ▶ State sizes of 512/1024 bits.
- ▶ Proposed security levels: 128/256 bits.

NORX8/16

- ▶ New variants for low-end systems.
- ▶ Based on 8-/16-bit words.
- ▶ State sizes of 128/256 bits.
- ▶ Proposed security levels: 80/96 bits.

Overview


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NORX8/16 – Layout




- ▶ monkeyDuplex construction.
- ▶ Process header, payload, trailer in one pass.
- ▶ Recommended parameter selections:

W	R	D	$ T $	$ K $	$ N $	b	r	c
8	4 or 6	1	80	80	32	128	40*	88*
16	4 or 6	1	96	96	32	256	128	128


* Uses new security bounds from *Security of Keyed Sponge Constructions Using a Modular Proof Approach* by E. Andreeva, J. Daemen, B. Mennink, and G. Van Assche (FSE'15).

NORX8/NORX16 – The Permutation F^R

The Permutation F



The Permutation G



- 1: $a \leftarrow H(a, b)$
- 2: $d \leftarrow (a \oplus d) \ggg r_0$
- 3: $c \leftarrow H(c, d)$
- 4: $b \leftarrow (b \oplus c) \ggg r_1$
- 5: $a \leftarrow H(a, b)$
- 6: $d \leftarrow (a \oplus d) \ggg r_2$
- 7: $c \leftarrow H(c, d)$
- 8: $b \leftarrow (b \oplus c) \ggg r_3$

The Non-linear Operation H

$$H : \{0, 1\}^{2n} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n, (x, y) \mapsto (x \oplus y) \oplus ((x \wedge y) \ll 1)$$

Rotation Offsets (r_0, r_1, r_2, r_3)

8-bit: (1, 3, 5, 7)

16-bit: (8, 11, 12, 15)

NORX8/16 – Misc

Estimations for HW Implementations

- ▶ NORX8: ≈ 1400 GE
- ▶ NORX16: ≈ 2900 GE

Preliminary Security Analysis

- ▶ Full diffusion after 2 rounds.
- ▶ No fixed-points $G(a, b, c, d) = (a, b, c, d)$ except for all-zero. Equivalently: F^R .
- ▶ Upper bounds for differential characteristics (determined with the help of SAT-/SMT-solvers):

W	F^2 (perm)	F (init)	F (init) + F^6 (perm)
8	2^{-29}	2^{-32}	$\leq 2^{-119}$
16	2^{-37}	2^{-53}	$\leq 2^{-164}$

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Conclusion

- ▶ NORX8/16: AEAD for resource-constrained systems.
- ▶ Work-in-progress paper: TRUDEVICE, Grenoble, 2015-03-13.
- ▶ Call to arms: “cryptanalyse them!”

Thank you!